For a new path: on the surrender of key Maoist leaders Politics & News

That the Maoist insurgency is on the back foot has been evident for months now. The Maoist presence has been limited to 11 districts, with its core areas whittled down to three — the forested and remote districts of Bijapur, Narayanpur and Sukma in Chhattisgarh. The credit for weakening what was once termed India’s “greatest internal security threat” must be shared by security forces that adapted counter-insurgency tactics to the realities on the ground, and district administrations and successive governments since the mid-2000s which accelerated developmental work. The defeat of the Maoists in hitherto impoverished tribal regions of central India followed a similar retreat from united Andhra Pradesh, which saw the same strategy. This made it near impossible for the insurgents to build alternative governance structures, eventually encircling cities — a plan followed by the Chinese Communist Party a century ago to defeat the Nationalists. The Maoists aimed to form base areas in remote districts of central and north-central India, in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, eastern Maharashtra, western Odisha and northern Andhra Pradesh. They expected support from tribals, many nursing disaffection due to the absence of the state and its developmental arms.

While areas such as Abujhmad in south Chhattisgarh, Gadchiroli in Maharashtra and parts of Odisha initially provided conditions for the Maoists to establish alternative institutions, over time, tribal unrest grew, with resentment over being used as pawns in militarist battles against the Indian state. This was partly because the Maoists privileged armed struggle over the economic uplift of tribals. The Maoists gained strength in the late 2000s when the Salwa Judum campaign resulted in massive displacement and brutal internecine battles, providing discontented recruits. However, the Supreme Court’s ban on the campaign and the professionalisation of anti-insurgency forces weakened the militant insurgency. Simultaneously, tribal people saw more benefits from a proactive state — despite persisting limitations — leading to growing disillusionment with the Maoist idea of a violent route towards an alternative state. This experience mirrors what transpired in Peru, Colombia, the Philippines and Malaysia. That this realisation has dawned upon senior Maoist leaders is evident when surrendered Politburo member Mallojula Venugopal Rao suggested that the only task left was to “abandon the dogmatic practice of the Chinese and Russian lines, regardless of the change in circumstances and time [in India]”. This opens the opportunity for the cadres to utilise spaces within Indian democracy for political engagement. Even if it has not convinced all the insurgents as yet, it will serve the people of the remaining districts and those committed to their uplift well if the Maoists abandon their struggle.