Constitutional clarity: On hearings on the Presidential Reference Politics & News

The hearings on the Presidential Reference that followed the Supreme Court judgment on April 8, 2025, clarifying the constitutional position on the powers of the Governor and the President in providing assent to Bills passed by State Assemblies, have largely confirmed that Governors should not indefinitely withhold assent to such Bills. Addressing the 14 questions posed in the Presidential Reference, the observations of the five-judge Bench largely converged on the constitutional principles elucidated in April. The question by the Chief Justice of India, B.R. Gavai, on whether the Court should “sit powerless” while Governors make “competent State legislatures defunct” echoed the core concern in the April judgment — that constitutional offices cannot paralyse democratic governance through inaction. While States’ counsel largely argued along political lines based on which parties governed them, this did not detract from the thorough examination of Articles 200 and 201 during the proceedings. The argument that the Constitution’s silence on specific timelines in these Articles does not grant unlimited discretion to Governors remains compelling. When the Solicitor-General argued that Governors serve as a “check on hasty legislation”, the Bench’s response also indicated the tension between this position and democratic principles. Justice Vikram Nath’s observation, that Governors “cannot sit over the wisdom of the legislature indefinitely”, was succinct.

That only Opposition-ruled States have faced prolonged delays, as pointed out by Kerala’s counsel, suggests the constitutional framework itself is not ambiguous but that its application has become selective. The Bench’s examination of why judicial review applies to Governors’ recommendations under Article 356 (President’s Rule) but supposedly not to actions under Article 200 (assent to Bills) highlighted potential inconsistencies in arguments defending unlimited discretion for Governors. The proceedings related to the questions posed in the Presidential Reference demonstrate why the April judgment’s framework remains constitutionally sound and necessary to maintain the balance between federal cooperation and State autonomy. The question from these hearings is on why the Centre chose this unusual route. As scholars have established, an advisory opinion by the Court under Article 143 does not override a binding judgment under Article 141. If the Centre genuinely sought clarity on the April judgment, well-established judicial procedures such as review petitions or curative petitions were available. When the Court’s final reply to the Reference is received, the Centre should accept the constitutional boundaries that the April judgment and these proceedings have reinforced, rather than continuing to pursue powers that would alter the delicate federal balance that the Constitution has established.