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Among the nearly 100 people who died during the U.S. military incursion in Venezuela that led to the abduction of President Nicolas Maduro, there were 32 Cubans who were part of Mr. Maduro’s security detail. Their presence reflects the intricate relations shared between Havana and Caracas.
Ever since Venezuela has been ruled by the Bolivarians, a movement led by former President Hugo Chavez, it has forged close ties with Cuba. Caracas has served as Cuba’s main source of imported oil under preferential terms in the “oil-for-doctors” scheme — Venezuela supplying subsidised crude in exchange for medical services, technology, and military assistance.
This was a major salve for a country starved of power supplies because of years of an economic embargo, called a blockade by the Cubans, imposed by the U.S. The subsidised Venezuelan oil allowed Cuba’s oil-dependent power system to function and spared it a huge expense, allowing it to conserve hard currency.
But the recent U.S. seizures of Venezuela-linked oil tankers has cut off deliveries to Cuba almost entirely since December 2025. Combined with intensified pressure on the island, this triggered a chain reaction of shortages — prolonged power cuts, fuel shortages, transportation, food supply disruptions.
Cuba’s oil dependency is structural. Electricity generation data shows that oil accounts for 83% of total power generation, with generation from oil rising steadily from about 12,700 GWh in 2000 to 16,500 GWh in 2023.
This dependence extends beyond power. Oil products make up 56% of Cuba’s total energy consumption, feeding industry, transport, agriculture, and households. Industrial oil consumption alone exceeded 65,000 terajoules in 2022, while transport and residential use together accounted for over 30,000 terajoules that year.
The energy crunch does not just dim the lights; it disrupts Cuba’s food supply chains. The country imports roughly 80% of its food, and prolonged blackouts interrupt refrigeration that are vital for preserving perishables.
In 2022, Venezuela supplied 75% of Cuba’s crude oil imports, with Russia accounting for the remaining 25%. But by 2023, Cuba began diversifying: Venezuela’s share dropped to 58%, Mexico emerged as a significant supplier at 31%, and Russia’s share fell to 11%.
By 2025, Venezuela still supplied a significant share of Cuba’s imported oil, but quantities had shrunk drastically compared with earlier decades. Reuters reporting shows that Venezuela was sending roughly 26,500 barrels per day to Cuba in 2025, covering about one-third of the island’s daily needs — down sharply from historical highs. Mexico supplied about 5,000 bpd, while Russia and other allies contributed only limited amounts. Moreover, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has explicitly said that the country is sending the same volumes it historically has, not scaling up output to meet Cuba’s escalating needs.
The dire situation Cuba faces is largely a result of the long-running U.S. embargo, which began in 1962 following the Cuban Revolution and the nationalisation of industries, including foreign-owned ones. The embargo was tightened significantly in the 1990s: the Torricelli Act (1992) barred foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba and introduced shipping restrictions, while the Helms-Burton Act (1996) codified sanctions into federal law, stripping the President of authority to unilaterally lift them.
The embargo has also resulted in Cuba’s financial exclusion from world trade, since all dollar transactions must clear through American banks. The U.S. redesignation of Cuba as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” in 2021 deepened this isolation; Cuban authorities have documented over 1,000 instances of foreign banks refusing services between 2021 and 2024.
UNCTAD data shows Cuba sliding from modest trade surpluses in the mid-2000s to deep and persistent deficits. By 2022, the trade deficit stood at $4.4 billion; it further deteriorated to $13.9 billion in 2023, the worst figure in the series.
With no purchasing power and restricted access to credit markets, Cuba cannot simply buy oil on commercial terms. The collapse of the Venezuelan arrangement following the U.S. invasion has exacerbated Cuba’s foreign exchange crisis and severely crippled its economy.
The data for the charts were sourced from the International Energy Agency, U.S. Energy Information Assessment, UN Trade and Development, World Food programme and American Economic Association.
Published – January 27, 2026 07:00 am IST
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How Venezuela’s oil collapse is plunging Cuba into energy and food crisis
