[ad_1]
The Jeffrey Energy Center coal-fired power plant operates at sunset near Emmett, Kansas, U.S.
| Photo Credit: AP
The story so far: U.S. President Donald Trump has signed a presidential memorandum withdrawing from 66 international organisations, such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
What does the U.S. exiting the FCCC mean?
Mr. Trump has been calling climate change a hoax. His government is also currently in the process of pulling the U.S. out of the Paris Agreement. On February 4, 2025, he issued an executive order requiring the government “to determine which organisations, conventions, and treaties [to which the U.S. is party] are contrary” to its interests. His decision to exit the FCCC and the IPCC are based on this review.

Pulling out of the FCCC will exclude the U.S. from the core framework that organises almost all multilateral climate diplomacy. For instance, it won’t have to participate in the FCCC reporting system, which records countries’ greenhouse gas emissions and progress towards their commitments, and thus allows nations to monitor their collective efforts and hold each other accountable. Legally, the FCCC provides a way for countries to withdraw should they see fit. The FCCC also says withdrawing from it is treated as withdrawing from any protocol to which the party belongs. This includes the Paris Agreement. In practical terms, this means the U.S. will cease to be a party inside the system that runs the annual Conference of the Parties (COP) negotiations and the processes by which the rules are drafted for transparency, carbon markets, financial architecture, etc. The country will also lose its ability to negotiate from inside the room at COPs even if it can still attend some meetings as an observer. However, it won’t have the legal standing to bargain as a party.
How will climate finance be affected?
The FCCC has established a financial mechanism with operating entities including the Global Environment Facility and the Green Climate Fund, and the COP oversees the arrangements of that mechanism. If the U.S. isn’t a party, it will lose its leverage inside the COP over how that financial architecture evolves while also making it politically easier for a U.S. administration to justify withholding contributions.
Conversely, the exit will also raise the ‘cost of doing climate business’ for U.S. companies. Many private sector enterprises, investors, insurers, and subnational governments currently plan around the expectation that global climate rules will become tighter over time, so the U.S.’s decision to exit the FCCC could signal more policy volatility, in turn increasing risk premiums and leaving U.S. exporters more exposed to foreign climate-related trade measures. For many partner countries climate cooperation has become tied up with broader negotiations on energy security, critical minerals, industrial policy, and development finance. The potential implication here is that countries may now become more unwilling to cut side deals with Washington in adjacent domains because they will have to account for the durability of the U.S.’s commitments.
What does the IPCC do?
The IPCC assesses scientific research on climate change, compiling reports that synthesise the current understanding of climate science, the consequences, and potential strategies policymakers everywhere can implement. Pulling out of the IPCC would weaken the U.S.’s role in owning the shared scientific references climate negotiations rely on. This doesn’t automatically mean “American scientists will no longer be involved in climate reports” but it likely will reduce U.S. involvement. The IPCC reports’ authors are put together by a process in which governments and observer organisations nominate experts and the IPCC Bureau creates teams. If the U.S. stops nominating, an important pipeline for U.S.-based expertise — which is considerable — becomes narrower.
This said, the IPCC explicitly encourages experts who are nominated but not selected to contribute as expert reviewers. This role is open and large in scope and U.S. researchers could still participate if their government steps back. U.S. scientists can also still be nominated via non-government routes, for example, by observer organisations.
What are the global repercussions?
The climate talks run on reciprocity. When a very wealthy country with high emissions decides to quit, it weakens the expectation that other major players will also play by the same shared rules. This in turn can harden poor countries’ positions; these countries already believe their rich counterparts promise more than they deliver. It can also give cover to other reluctant governments to delay or dilute action.
The timing is also unfortunate because the conversation on climate finance has shifted from the older $100 billion goal towards much larger needs and new targets. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, economically developed countries mobilised $115.9 billion in climate finance in 2022, the first time it exceeded $100 billion. However, adaptation finance remains far below the need: the UN Adaptation Gap Report 2025 estimated it to be $310-365 billion per year by 2035 while international public adaptation finance flows were about $26 billion in 2023.
At the COP29 summit in 2024, governments agreed to a new collective quantified goal of at least $300 billion per year by 2035. The U.S. exiting the world’s main climate action bodies makes it harder to make credible deals to reach these numbers because other countries will ask why they should pay more when a major historical emitter is stepping away.
Published – January 11, 2026 05:10 am IST
[ad_2]
How will the U.S. exit affect climate action? | Explained


